INTRODUCTION
The theory of implementation studies the problem of designing decen-Ž . tralized institutions ''mechanisms'' through which certain socially desirable objectives can be achieved. More precisely, a social choice rule is Ž . implemented by a game-form mechanism if, for every possible environ-Ž . Ž . ment preference profile , the solution set of equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism coincides with the set of outcomes of the social choice rule.
This definition implicitly assumes that agents are always able to play equilibrium strategies. However, there is substantial empirical and experimental evidence against this theoretical presumption. 3 In spite of this evidence, research in implementation theory has paid little attention to the problem of how equilibrium is achieved. 4 Since the planner should be Ž concerned with the performance of the mechanism when some if not all . of the agents are not as ''rational'' as expected, it is useful to test the mechanism's performance in the presence of some form of bounded rationality.
A more fundamental approach to these issues would require the planner to take bounded rationality into account, when designing the game agents play. This necessarily leads to an alternative definition of implementation which includes, among the variables which specify the ''environment,'' the learning protocols agents use, as well as initial conditions of the dynamic process. In this respect, we propose the following definition. For a given set of environments ⌽ and a given set of dynamics D, a social choice rule is dynamically implemented by a mechanism if, for all g ⌽ and d g D, the limiting set of outcomes coincides with the set of outcomes of the social choice rule.
There is a caveat here. Why should we focus only on limiting outcomes? The planner may also care about what happens on the way to equilibrium, as the dynamic path may include outcomes significantly different than 3 Ž . See Cooper et al. 1991 for the prisoner's dilemma, a strictly dominance solvable game, Ž . McKelvey and Palfrey 1991 for the centipede game, a game with a unique Nash equilibrium, Ž . and Guth et al. 1982 for the ultimatum game, which has a unique subgame perfecẗ equilibrium. 4 Ž . Ž . Noticeable exceptions are the papers of Muench and Walker 1984 , Walker 1984 , Jordan 1986 , Vega-Redondo 1989 , De Trenqualye 1988 , 1989 , and Cabrales 1999 what the choice rule prescribes. This, in turn, would require one to fully characterize the planner's preferences, rather than specify the most preferred outcome, for any given state of the environment. This is something the implementation literature traditionally leaves unspecified. Moreover, if the planner does not discount the future and the game is played infinitely often, then it is legitimate to look at limiting outcomes.
Ž . In this paper we study the dynamic implementation of Sjostrom's 1994m echanism. 5 We concentrate on Sjostrom's mechanism for several rea-s ons. First, the conditions for implementation are quite weak. Although the environments that are permitted are not universal, they are rich enough for most economic purposes. Furthermore, this reduction in the domain allows the author to implement the social choice rule with a ''bounded'' game, that is, a game which does not exploit equilibrium nonexistence to rule out undesirable outcomes. 6 Finally, the game can be solved by one round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies, and then another round of deletion of strictly dominated strategies. This feature of the mechanism makes it particularly attractive since, under some assumptions of imperfect knowledge of agents, 7 the appropriate solution concept implies one round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies, and then the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies.
Ž . In Sjostrom's 1994 mechanism agents are arranged to simultaneouslÿä nnounce their own preferences, together with the preferences of their two closest neighbors. The mechanism is designed in such a way that the truthful report of one's own preferences is weakly dominant, as it does not Ž . affect one's payoff, except for a set of so-called totally inconsistent states, Ž . where it is strictly preferable to report preferences truthfully. Since, for this mechanism, it is always advantageous to report the same preferences about your neighbors as what they are reporting about themselves, it is clear that the only equilibrium that survives the first round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies is the truth-telling one.
However, there are many other Nash equilibria. In particular, for every Ž preference profile R, there is a component i.e., a closed and connected . set of equilibria in which all agents report the preferences for their neighbors indicated in R, and report the preferences about themselves Ž . indicated in R with high enough this need not be very high probability. 5 Ž . Ž . Sjostrom's 1994 mechanism and the one proposed by Jackson et al. 1994 for separablëë nvironments are very similar. Most of our results would generalize easily for that mechanism as well.
6
Ž . For example, in the canonical mechanism for Nash implementation Repullo, 1987 , if agents disagree widely on the announced preferences, they have to play a game in which the agent announcing the highest integer wins a prize.
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Ž . Either because of payoff uncertainty, as in Dekel and Fudenberg 1990 , or through lack Ž . of common knowledge of rationality, as in Borgers 1994 . This is because it is important for the mechanism that all agents match their neighbors' announcements about themselves, but the report about Ž . oneself is only important in some unlikely totally inconsistent state.
First, we study the performance of the mechanism under monotonic Ž . dynamics Nachbar, 1990 , which essentially imply higher growth rates for those strategies which perform better.
8 For these dynamics, we show Ž . Proposition 4 that many equilibria in all equilibrium components are limit points of trajectories of the evolutionary dynamics that have com-Ž pletely mixed initial conditions that is, initial conditions that give strictly . positive weights to all possible messages . Even when the dynamics con-Ž verge to the ''right'' component of equilibria i.e., the one which contains . the solution of the mechanism , they need not go to the ''right'' equilib-Ž . rium. We also show by example Proposition 2 that the initial conditions that lead to these equilibria need not be close to the limiting point. We Ž also study how the dynamic structure reacts to the introduction of arbi-. trarily small perturbations in the vectorfield. In the example we show Ž . Proposition 6 that, although there is a unique structurally stable compo-Ž nent namely, the component which contains the undominated equilibrium . of the game , the untruthful component is stable for a non-negligible set of admissible perturbations. Ž In other words, the less responsive the dynamics are to payoffs the . further the initial conditions from the ''right'' equilibrium , the more difficult it is to converge to the desired solution. Only in the extreme case Ž of best-reply dynamics in which the response to arbitrarily small payoff . Ž . differences is infinite , we show Proposition 7 that any interior trajectory converges to the pure strategy equilibrium in which players reveal their true preferences and the outcome desired by the planner is achieved.
The fact that evolution need not eliminate weakly dominated strategies Ž . has been known since, at least, Nachbar 1990 . However, we are far from possessing a sound theory on the evolutionary properties of weakly dominance solvable games, as we have examples in which a single round of deletion is not allowed if we want to characterize the limiting set of the Ž evolutionary dynamics see, for example, Samuelson, 1993 and Cressman . and Schlag, 1998 , as well as games in which only strategies which survive Ž . an arbitrarily large number of rounds of deletion can be in the support of Ž the limiting play see, for the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma, Cress-. man, 1996; or for the centipede game, Ponti, 2000 . Since the theory has not proposed, so far, a suitable framework to explain these differences, it is 8 One particularly well known member of the family of monotonic dynamics is the so-called Ž . replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory Taylor and Jonker, 1978 . These dynamics Ž . have been given a learning theoretic foundation by Borgers and Sarin 1997 , and they can Ž . also be interpreted as a model of imitation Schlag, 1994 . Ž . important to test the evolutionary properties of game-form mechanisms in which the iterated deletion of dominated strategies plays such a crucial role. In this respect, our findings are very similar to those of Gale et al. Ž . 1995 . They analyze the classic chain store game, another game which has a Nash equilibrium component in which a player selects a weakly dominated strategy with positive probability. In both cases, these components are reachable by the evolutionary dynamics, and therefore should not be discarded as a reasonable predictor of the asymptotic play.
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some notation, we describe the mechanism, and we make the Ž assumptions about the dynamics. In Section 3 we fully characterize for all . interior initial conditions the set of limit points of any monotonic dynamic Ž . for the game in Fig. 1 Sjostrom, 1994 to be considered as a simplifiedv ersion of the mechanism. In Section 4 we give local results on the convergence and stability properties of the Nash equilibrium components of the general game. In Section 5 we describe the structural stability properties of the equilibria of the simplified mechanism. Section 6 explores Ž . the dynamic implementation of Sjostrom's 1994 mechanism under best-r eply dynamics. Finally, Section 7 concludes, together with an appendix containing the proofs of the relevant propositions.
THE MODEL AND THE DYNAMICS

Ž
. We introduce a few changes to Sjostrom's 1994 model for analyticalc onvenience. First, we employ a Von Neumann᎐Morgenstern utility function instead of a preference relation. This is because we need to specify the payoff functions for mixed strategies, as the dynamics are defined on the mixed strategy space. We also assume that the set of possible preference parameters is finite. This is because the dimension of the pure strategy space is related with the set of preferences. If we had an infinite dimensional pure strategy space, the dynamics, which account for the relative frequency with which each pure strategy is being used, would have to describe the evolution of a measure over an infinite space. This seems an unnecessary complication for our purposes. 
We say that a mechanism ⌫ implements a social choice function f in
We say that a mechanism ⌫ implements a social choice function f with Ž . iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies if for all R g ⌽, f R s Ž . IWD ⌫, R .
We now construct a mechanism. Let M s ⌽ = ⌽ = ⌽ , so that each individual announces the
preferences of her two neighbors, and let members of M and M be i denoted m and m, respectively. A generic strategy is therefore m s i i
. . , j both announce the preference of
X choose a and a so that¨a, R )¨a , R for all a in the line segment
and, for every i and m , define 
. the set ␤ ., . is constructed in such a way that c ␤ R , R , R is strictly
is weakly dominated by a message m s R , R , R ; i.e., un-
truthful announcements about oneself are weakly dominated. Once these weakly dominated strategies are eliminated and all agents iâ nnounce the true preferences about themselves, R s R , it is strictly i i dominated to announce untruthful preferences about your neighbors,
neighbors is punished with the zero consumption bundle. Ž . These two facts establish the main theorem in Sjostrom 1994 .P ROPOSITION 0. Let f be an arbitrary social choice function. The mechanism described abo¨e implements f in UNE and in IWD.
It is important to notice, for the discussion we undertake below, that the set of states in which not announcing the true preferences about oneself is weakly dominated are themselves states that typically produce very bad Ž outcomes for other opponents at least one of them will have zero . consumption and probably many . If agents learn fast to avoid these Ž . totally inconsistent states, there is no incentive to tell the truth about oneself. The mechanism we have just described focuses on consensus announcements, since disagreement is punished with zero consumption; truth-telling is only rewarded in a set of states which need not be very prominent in the minds of the players. This is precisely the reason why, if agents are boundedly rational in the way we describe, convergence to the social choice outcome function may fail to occur.
We now move on to the characterization of the evolutionary dynamics we analyze.
Fix a given mechanism ⌫ and a given preference profile R g ⌽. Let x m i i be the probability assigned by agent i to message m , and let x g ⌬ be a
. simplex which describes player i's mixed strategy space . Let also x g yi ⌬ ' = ⌬ be a mixed strategy profile for agents other than i, with
We formalize player i's behavior in terms of the mixed strategy x t he i Ž . or she adopts at each point in time. The vector x t will then describe the state of the system at time t, defined over the state space ⌬, with ⌬ 0 denoting its relative interior, i.e., the set of completely mixed strategy profiles.
Ž . Assumption d.1. The evolution of x t is given by a system of continuous-time differential equations:
Ž . We require that the autonomous system 1 satisfies the standard Ž . Ž . regularity condition; i.e., D must be i Lipschitz continuous with ii
of strategy m . Then for all m , m X g M and all x g ⌬ it must be that
2 is commonly used in the literature to capture the essence of a selecti¨e evolutionary process. 9 Given the mixed strategy profile played at each point in time, strategies with higher expected payoff grow faster than poorly performing ones.
Assumption d.3 is also standard in the evolutionary literature. It excludes the possibility that the selection dynamic acts only on a subset of the strategy space. This possibility arises because any solution of a mono-Ž .
0 tonic selection dynamics leaves any face of ⌬, as well as ⌬ , invariant Ž . and, a fortiori, forward invariant . In other words, a strategy that has zero weight at time zero would also have zero weight at all subsequent times. If Assumption d.3 did not hold, the selection dynamics would then operate on a different game.
AN EXAMPLE
We prefix the dynamic analysis of the mechanism with the following Ž . example, taken from Sjostrom 1994, p. 504 , which is intended to conveÿẗ he essence of our results. There is one unit of a single divisible private good, which has to be divided among three players: 1, 2, and 3. Preferences of players 1 and 2 are increasing in the amount of the good they consume, and are common knowledge for all players and the planner. There are two possible types for player 3's preferences, which are indexed by 0 and 1. Preferences of type 0 peak at consumption 1r3; preferences of type 1 peak at consumption 1r2. Player 3's type is common knowledge among the players, but the planner does not know it. Ž . outcome f 0 s 1r4, 1r4, 1r2 ; for preferences of type 1, f 1 s Ž . 1r3, 1r3, 1r3 . Notice that the social choice function is such that type 3 Ž . Ž . would prefer the outcome f 1 when she is of type 0, and the outcome f 0 when she is of type 1. This provides her with an incentive to conceal her type, and therefore the planner needs a nontrivial mechanism to elicit her true preferences.
The mechanism proposed by Sjostrom requires the three players töm ake a simultaneous statement about the preferences of player 3. Let 1 Ž 0 . Ž m m , i g I represent the message in which preferences of type 1 type i i . 0 for player 3 are announced by player i. Figure 1 illustrates the outcome function of the mechanism. As for its dynamic analysis, we shall focus on the case in which true preferences of player 3 are of type 1, and assume that Fig. 1 also represents the game's payoffs when player 3's preferences are of type 1. We denote this game by G. Player 1 picks a row, player 2 a column, and player 3 picks a matrix. We first note that the mechanism leads to a game which is weakly dominance Ž . sol¨able, as it can be reduced to a single outcome the solution by the iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. In particular, only one round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies, and then an additional round of deletion of strictly dominated strategies, is needed. In consequence, unlike other weakly dominance solvable games, the same outcome is selected independently on the order by which strategies are deleted. other agents have no dominated strategies at this stage . The reason is that, like in the mechanism described in Section 2, truth-telling about your 10 Ž . Using Marx and Swinkels' 1997 terminology, game G is in fact weakly dominance Ž . solvable in a nice sense. So is Sjostrom's 1994 general mechanism presented in the previouss ection.
own preferences never hurts, and is strictly optimal when the opponents disagree on your own type. 
Proof. See Cabrales and Ponti 1998, Proposition 1 .
Ž .
We now move on to dynamics. Denote by RE G the set of restpoints of Ž . G under any monotonic dynamic. It is straightforward to show that RE G Ž . contains together with all the pure strategy profiles only the components
Our task is to study the asymptotics of a monotonic selection dynamic whose initial state lies in the relative interior of the state space.
Proof. See the Appendix.
If initial conditions are completely mixed, we then know from Proposition 2 that the evolutionary dynamics will eventually converge to a Nash equilibrium of the game. In the next section we show that this result Ž . generalizes locally also in the case of Sjostrom's 1994 mechanism, asd escribed in Section 2.
11 The fact that each player has only two available options also allows us to express the dynamics in terms of the payoff difference between player i's truthful and untruthful strategy,
LOCAL RESULTS FOR THE GENERAL GAME
In Proposition 3 we characterize some components of Nash equilibria for the game induced by the mechanism. In particular, we show that any Ž . message profile in which the agents are unanimous in the arbitrary U Ž preference profile they announce, R more precisely, the preferences U . they announce about their neighbors and themselves are taken from R , is an equilibrium. Furthermore, any mixed strategy profile in which agents mix between messages consistent with R U and other messages that only differ in the announcements agents make about their own preferences is also an equilibrium, provided that messages in R U are given a high enough weight. The equilibria in each of these components are not payoff equiva-Ž lent, since disagreeing with a neighbor event with nonzero probability in . these mixed equilibria results in a punishment. Nevertheless, Proposition 4 shows that this punishment is not high enough to prevent these equilibria to be the limit points of some interior path of any monotonic selection dynamic.
Before we proceed, some further terminology is needed. Let m
. max¨f R , R be the utility associated to the most preferred outcome 
S R
where we assumeÛ
for all i and j / i. The set S R is the set of all mixed strategies in i which i's announcements about her neighbors agrees with R U , and the probability of announcing R U is higher than k .
Ž .
To understand the role of 4 in the proof of Proposition 3, notice that, k j Ž U . against any x g = S R , the payoff for agent i using strategy yi j / i j Ž U . m g S R satisfies the following condition:
Ž . 
Ž . Ž . From Eqs. 5 and 6 , it follows that
Ž . which implies u m x y u m , x G 0, provided that 4 is satisfied. We shall now prove the elements in all the Nash equilibria components characterized by Proposition 3 are reachable, i.e., are limit points for some interior solution. By Lipschitz continuity, there exists a constant K ) 0 such that for all m , x , and x X , we have that
< < where the . denotes the norm of a vector. This in turn implies that, for all Ž Ž .. Ž X Ž .. h ) 0 with u m , x t y u m , x t F yh , there exists some h )
any m g S R , it also must be
w . R , R y¨0, R , then there exists another constant H g 0, 1 , with
H for all j and t, then strategies not in S R are j i decreasing at a rate not higher than yh . Ž .
Ž . Proposition 4 b guarantees that pure strategy equilibria in all equilib-Ž . rium components including the ''wrong'' ones are attractors of interior Ž . Ž equilibrium remember that the equilibria are not payoff equivalent, as the mixed strategy equilibria have lower expected payoff because agents are . punished for announcing discordant preferences .
Convergence to mixed equilibria may occur because payoffs to all 
MORE ON THE EXAMPLE STABILITY WITHrOUT DRIFT
In the previous section, we extended the convergence result of Proposition 2 to the general mechanism, showing that the limit points of the dynamics for interior initial conditions are generally different from the outcomes intended by the planner. We now go back to our example to test the stability properties of the various equilibrium components. Ž Ž .. Ž . DEFINITION 1. Let x t, x 0 be the solution of 1 on state space ⌬ Ž . given initial conditions x 0 . Let also C be a closed set of restpoints in ⌬ of the same differential equation. Then: To simplify the analysis, we set additional conditions on the dynamics, Ž which is the purpose of the following assumption, which replaces Assump-. tions d.1᎐3 : Ž . Assumption d.4. The evolution of x t is given by the system of continuous-time differential equations
In words, the evolutionary dynamic is now composed of two additive terms. The first represents the standard replicator dynamic, while the second term ensures that, at each point in time, each strategy is played with positive probability, no matter how it performs against the current Ž opponents' mixed strategy profile i.e., it points the dynamic toward the . relati¨e interior of the state space ⌬ . Following Binmore and Samuelson Ž . 1999 , this latter term is called drift: it opens the model to the possibility Ž . of a heterogeneity of behaviors. Gale et al. 1995 behavior is represented by a generic, constant, completely mixed strategy Ž . i.e., ␤ , while the rest of the population aggregate behavior follows the i replicator dynamics. The relative importance of the drift is measured by , which we refer to as the drift le¨el. We assume to be ''very small,'' reflecting the fact that all the major forces which govern the dynamics should be captured by the evolutionary dynamic defined by D, which here takes the form of the replicator dynamics.
We check how the model reacts to the introduction of such a perturbation. The stability analysis of the replicator dynamics with drift will give us information about the effects of small changes in the vector field on the Ž equilibria of the system defined by the replicator dynamic in other words, . it will test the structural stability of such equilibria . To simply the exposition, ␤ and ␤ have been chosen to be 1r2, since only the value of ␤ 1 2 3 turns out to be genuinely significant. We start by looking at the case of the replicator dynamic without drift Ž . i.e., when s 0 . We know from Proposition 2 that NE is globally interior attracting, since it attracts every interior path under any monotonic selec-Ž . tion dynamic of which the replicator dynamic is a special case . We now take a closer look at the stability properties of each component of Nash Ž 0 1 . equilibria separately i.e., NE and NE . Figure 2 shows a phase diagram describing trajectories of the replicator dynamic starting from some interior initial conditions. The Nash equilib-0 Ž 1 . rium component NE NE is represented by a bold segment in the Ž . bottom-left top-right corner of the state space ⌬. First notice that, as we know from Proposition 2, all trajectories converge to a Nash equilibrium of Ž . the game. Moreover, the diagram shows consistently with Proposition 4 that there are some trajectories of the replicator dynamic which converge to NE 0 , the Nash equilibrium component in which both players 1 and 2 deliver the false message with probability 1. However, this latter component is not asymptotically stable, as can be easily spotted from the We now move to the analysis of the replicator dynamic with drift.
Ž . Let ␤ g 0, 1 be a generic element of the space of the feasible perturbation. Figure 3 shows trajectories of the replicator dynamic with drift Ž . under two different specifications of ␤. show, there is a local attractor close to NE 1 in both cases. Moreover, none 0 Ž . of the elements of NE is a restpoint of the dynamic with drift in Fig. 3 b . Ž . In contrast, in Fig. 3 a there is an additional local attractor which belongs to NE 0 : trajectories starting close to NE 0 converge to it, as it happens in the case of the replicator dynamics without drift. values of x , the drift against the untruth-telling strategy is substantially i lower for player 3 than for her opponents.
In the following proposition we characterize the set of restpoints of the dynamic with drift, together with their stability properties:
Ž . PROPOSITION 6. Let RE ␤ be the set of restpoints of 8 for sufficiently close to 0. The following properties hold: Proof. See the Appendix.
As we acknowledged in Section 1, there is a striking similarity between Ž . the content of Proposition 6 and the findings of Gale et al. 1995 . They also find that, for the entry game, the Nash component in which the incumbent carries out her ''incredible threat'' is reachable under the replicator dynamics. Moreover, like our NE 0 , it fails to be interior asymptotically stable, but for certain parameter values it may be asymptotically stable when the system is slightly perturbed. Given the failure of asymptotic stability without perturbations, one would expect any perturbation to move the system away from the unstable component and the weakly dominated strategy to become extinct. Proposition 6 tells us that evolutionary game theory does not provide a ground for such a claim. Once again, Ž . the intuition here is similar to the one in Gale et al. 1995 . When there is drift, strategies against which the weakly dominated strategy does poorly will have positive weight at all times and, therefore, the part of the dynamics that depends on payoffs pushes against the dominated strategy. On the other hand, drift may provide a direct push in favor of the Ž dominated strategy and more crucially, in favor of those strategies of the . other players which do well against the dominated strategy . When the balance between these two forces is right, one gets a stable equilibrium with non-negligible weight for the dominated strategy.6
. BEST-REPLY DYNAMICS AND SJOSTROM'S MECHANISM
Ž .
In this section, we consider an alternative scenario. Suppose that x t evolves according to the dynamics
Ž . Ž .
Ž . with BR x denoting the mixed strategy best-reply correspondence BR:
This alternative dynamic defines a continuous-time version of the classic best-reply dynamics, often proposed as an alternative to the evolutionary dynamics studied hereto. We can give two interpretations to Ž . Ž . Ž . 9 . Following Matsui 1992 , we can use 9 to approximate the evolution of an infinite population of players who occasionally update their strategy, Ž . Ž . selecting a best reply to the current population state x t . Alternatively, 9 Ž can be regarded as the continuous-time limit up to a reparametrization of . 14 time of the well known fictitious play dynamic. This dynamic accounts for the evolution of players' beliefs, when these beliefs follow the empirical Ž frequencies with which each pure strategy profile has been played and . perfectly observed in the past, and agents select, at each point in time, a pure strategy among those which maximize their expected payoff, given their current beliefs.
Ä 4 with s s s , i g I denoting the pure Nash equilibrium in which all agentŝˆi Ž consistently reveal their true preferences i.e., the ''solution'' of ⌫ given . the true preference profile R .
Ž . PROPOSITION 7. Any interior solution of 9 con¨erges to s.
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Ž .
Notice that, for some x g ⌬, BR x can take infinitely many values. Thus, uniqueness of Ž . Ž . the solution of 9 is not guaranteed. However, since BR x is upper-hemicontinuous with Ž . closed and convex values, it can be shown that the differential inclusion x g BR x y x haṡ Ž . Ž Ž. . at least one interior solution x t, x 0 , which is Lipschitz continuous and defined, for any Ž . Ž . t G 0 Aubin and Cellina, 1984, Chap. 2 . On the stability properties of 9 see Hofbauer Ž . 1997 . 14 Ž . First introduced by Brown 1951 as an algorithm to compute Nash equilibria, fictitious Ž . play has been recently re-interpreted as a learning model by Fudenberg and Kreps 1993 . We prefer here the non-standard version in continuous-time to be consistent with the rest of the paper. Nevertheless, in an earlier version of this paper we prove that the same results still hold if the dynamics are defined in discrete-time.
For best-reply dynamics we have shown that every interior solution converges to the unique equilibrium whose outcome is the one the planner wants to implement. This is so because since initial beliefs are completely mixed, they will always be completely mixed, so these weakly dominated strategies will always remain suboptimal, will never be played, and their weight in beliefs will eventually vanish. This implies that nonequilibrium strategies by which agents misrepresent their neighbors' preferences become also suboptimal, and agents will learn not to use them.
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The results obtained here are so different from those we derived in the previous sections essentially because the difference in growth rates be-Ž . tween two pure strategies, in the case of the best-reply dynamics 9 , need not satisfy Lipschitz continuity. The only strategies with a positive growth rate are best responses; this implies that there is an infinite response of growth rates to changes in the sign of the differences in payoffs, which is precisely what Lipschitz continuity rules out.
CONCLUSIONS
We have argued that there is room for doubt about the practicability of one of the leading examples of implementation with iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies when agents are boundedly rational. As we said in Section 1, there are only few papers that study implementation with boundedly rational players, so a deeper theoretical study with evolutionary tools of other mechanisms studied in the literature would enhance our understanding of the performance of these mechanisms with this type of agent, a necessary step before mechanisms are used in real life.
Further empirical study is at least as necessary. It would, for example, help to answer the question about which of the dynamics assumptions is more appropriate. In this sense, there is already some evidence on mecha-Ž . nism design and learning algorithms. Chen and Tang 1998 have done experiments with the basic quadratic mechanism by Groves and Ledyard Ž . Ž . 1977 and the paired-difference mechanism by Walker 1981 . They estimate different learning models using experimental data, showing that Ž variants of stimulus᎐response learning algorithms whose expected law of . motion is the replicator dynamics outperform the generalized fictitious play model. This is also consistent with the good performance that Roth Ž . and Erev 1995 show for stimulus᎐response learning algorithms in mim-15 Ž . By analogy, it can be proved that every interior trajectory of 9 , for game ⌫, converges to Ž .Ž . 1, 1, 1 see Cabrales and Ponti, 1998, Proposition 7 . icking the behavior of a range of experimental data, which includes other weakly dominance solvable games, like the ultimatum game.
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But even more importantly, the empirical and experimental work would help to design games with good convergence properties to the preferred social outcome by revealing how people adjust their play in games like that studied in this paper, as well as in other mechanisms proposed by the literature. We have already begun to do such experimental studies.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 2. To prove the proposition, it is enough to show that any interior trajectory converges. The reason is that, once convergence has been proved, we can apply the standard result ''convergence Ž implies Nash under any monotonic selection dynamics'' see, e.g., Weibull, Ž .. 1995, Theorem 5.2 iii .
We start by observing that the dynamic is forward invariant. This implies Ž . that x t is always defined and positive, for any nonnegative t. By within this range unless the system converges to a Nash equilibrium. To do Ž . so given the special features of our example it is enough to show that, if U Ž . x g 0, 1 , then both players 1 and 2 select, in the limit, the same pure 3 strategy. Given that this implies convergence of the full mixed strategy 16 Ž . In their paper, Roth and Erev 1995 show that these dynamics explain the data significantly better, according to quadratic deviation measures and others, than a generalized fictitious play model which can accommodate behaviors ranging from fictitious play to best response dynamics by the estimation of a ''forgetfulness parameter'' which weights past Ž . information. For the experimental evidence on learning rules, see also Tang 1996 , Chen Ž . Ž . et al. 1997 , and Mookherjee and Sopher 1997 Ž . Ž . See Gantner et al. 1998 . profile, the result follows. More formally, what we need to prove is contained in the following lemma:
Proof. Assume, for the purpose of contradiction, that neither of the Ä 4 ϱ above statements is true. In this case, there must exist a sequence t k ks1 Ž . and a positive constant ) 0 such that either x t ) , i s 1, 2, or i k Ž . Ž x t -1 y , i s 1, 2 for all k in other words, assume that the system i k stays infinitely often an away from the faces of ⌬ in which player 1 and 2 . play the same pure strategy . We already noticed that these are the only faces of ⌬ in which both pure strategies for player 3 yield the same payoff. If the system stays away from these faces infinitely often along the solution Ž Ž .. path, then the integral of the payoff difference ⌬⌸ x t goes to infinity 3 as t goes to infinity. Ž Ž .. which, after each t , -x -1 y , i s 1, 2 and therefore ⌬⌸ x t still
as the time derivative of the log of the ratio between the probabilities with which each of player i's pure strategies are played, which can be expressed in terms of the difference in the growth rates: 
Ž Ž .. )
. If we integrate the value of ␥ x t over time we then obtain Ž tent states the only states where announcements about i's own type . influence her own payoff are excluded.
Ž . which is great than zero since, by 4 ,
The following lemma will be useful in the proof of Proposition 4.
By Lipschitz continuity we have that
s g m , x and x y x s X , the result follows bŷˆî
Ž . adding up inequalities 11 and 12 .
Proof of Proposition 4. By contradiction.
Ž .
Suppose that a is the statement that stops being true earliest, that it U Ž . does so for agent i and strategy m g S R and that the boundary time is i i t X . Then it must be
Notice that, for all t,
1 y x 0 Ž . which is a contradiction. Since this exhausts all cases the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof is constructed as follows. We first Ž . characterize the limit of the set of restpoints RE ␤ , and then analyze the stability properties of each of its elements.
Ž . We start by observing that, given ␤ g 0, 1 , any restpoint must be Ž . completely mixed, and it also must be x ) ␤, as ⌬⌸ . is always positive . strategy . We also know, by continuity of the vectorfield with respect to , that every limiting restpoint of the dynamic, as goes to zero, must lie in Ž . the set of restpoints of the unperturbed dynamic RE G . First, we analyze the limit set of restpoints under CASE 0. In this case, both players 1 and 2 play their strategy m 0 with probability 1, that is Remember that x must be a real, positive number, with ␤ -x -. For Following the same procedure for the remaining restpoints of the unper-Ž Ž . turbed dynamics i.e., the pure strategy profiles which belong to RE G . and do not satisfy either CASE 0 or CASE 1 does not add any element to the limiting set of restpoints of the perturbed dynamics. This should not be surprising, as any other restpoint of the unperturbed replicator dynamics is unstable with respect to the interior. Since this exhausts all cases, the result follows.
We now move to establish the stability properties of each limiting Ž . restpoint separately. The Jacobian matrix J x, for the dynamic system is as follows: y 1 y x x1 1 y x 1 y x1 x1 7 q x Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž .
